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Abstract
The modern literature on city formation and development, for exam-
ple the New Economic Geography literature, has studied the agglomeration
of agents in size or mass. We investigate agglomeration in sorting or by
type of worker, that implies agglomeration in size when worker populations
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di¤er by type. This kind of agglomeration can be driven by asymmet-
ric information in the labor market, specically when rms do not know
if a particular worker is of high or low skill. In a model with two types
and two regions, workers of di¤erent skill levels are o¤ered separating con-
tracts in equilibrium. When mobile low skill worker population rises or
there is technological change that favors high skilled workers, integration of
both types of workers in the same region at equilibrium becomes unstable,
whereas sorting of worker types into di¤erent regions in equilibrium remains
stable. The instability of integrated equilibria results from rms, in the
region to which workers are perturbed, o¤ering attractive contracts to low
skill workers when there is a mixture of workers in the region of origin.
Keywords: Adverse Selection, Agglomeration.
JEL Codes: R12, D82, R13.
1 Introduction
What are the driving forces behind the formation and growth of cities? This
question has vexed urban economists for many years. Informal explanations have
been o¤ered, but formal models of the important and ubiquitous phenomenon have
proved elusive. The answers to this question have important policy implications,
since the various models could feature equilibrium allocations that are e¢ cient,
or second best, or worse. Thus, it is important to know which model is prevalent
in each case, so that appropriate corrective policy, if needed, can be applied. For
these reasons, it is important to have both a variety of models as well as testable
hypotheses to distinguish among them. It is unlikely that one model, such as the
one presented below or that of the New Economic Geography (see the early work
of Abdel-Rahman, 1988, 1990; Fujita, 1988; Abdel-Rahman and Fujita, 1990; and
the modern model development of Krugman, 1991, and Fujita et al 1999), will
explain the economics of all cities in all time periods. For example, Ellison and
Glaeser (1997, 1999) nd that at least half the explanation for agglomeration lies
in natural advantages of a location. Natural advantages are important factors at
the historical initiation of a city, but market factors are what keep cities where
they are and help them to grow after the initial natural advantages diminish.1
1Mining towns have natural advantages when natural resources are discovered, but might
vacate with resource exhaustion.
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It is generally di¢ cult to construct equilibrium models of agglomeration. Stud-
ies of the formation and growth of cities are subject to Starretts Spatial Impos-
sibility Theorem (see Mills, 1967; Starrett, 1978; Fujita, 1986; and Fujita and
Thisse, 2002, chapter 2.3), namely that a model featuring a closed economy with
no relocation cost, location independent preferences and production, and perfect
and complete markets everywhere has no equilibrium where any commodity is
transported. An implication is that there is no agglomeration of agents in equi-
librium.2 Various models, such as those used in the New Economic Geography
or regional science more generally, employ delicate combinations of agglomera-
tive and repulsive forces to avoid the Theorem (by violating at least one of its
assumptions) and to generate equilibria with cities and agglomeration.
The modern literature on cities has a focus on agglomeration in size. Hints
about the sources of a broader kind of agglomeration can be found in data and
empirical work. For example, Berry and Glaeser (2005) nd that levels of human
capital in cities have been diverging over time. In other words, more skilled and
less skilled workers are agglomerating separately.3 Combes et al (2008) nd strong
evidence that wage disparities between French cities are driven by sorting by skill.
What is the explanation for agglomeration with sorting? Observations about two
other phenomena can help address this question. U.S. Department of Commerce
(1975) data show that over the long term, labor has moved out of agriculture and
into other industries, thus freeing low skill workers from ties to land and allowing
them to become mobile. Second, rising income and wage inequality have been
attributed to skill-biased technological change (see for example Acemoglu, 1999;
Berman et al, 1994; and Caselli, 1999). The purpose of our work is to provide a
model that is consistent with all of these phenomena. We show that asymmetric
information in the labor market drives agglomeration of workers sorted by skill.4
When mobile low skilled worker population rises or there is technological change
that favors higher skilled workers, integration of worker types in the same loca-
tion at equilibrium becomes unstable, while sorting of worker types into di¤erent
2Or, alternatively, there is no equilibrium at all.
3One common denition of agglomeration can be found at
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/agglomeration: bunch, clump, cluster, clustering - a
grouping of a number of similar things; a bunch of trees; a cluster of admirers Of course,
we would like to add a cluster of workers with the same skill level.
4For our purposes, skills could be represented by human capital, as is standard in the litera-
ture, or by social skills, as in Blum et al (2006).
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locations in equilibrium remains stable. Therefore, our model suggests that in-
creased mobility of low skill labor and skill biased technological change causes the
geographic sorting of workers by skill.
The basic elements of models explaining agglomeration of any kind can be
stripped down to a two region framework, where there is no presumed asymmetry
among regions. A geographically symmetric equilibrium is present, where the
economic activity at every location looks like that at any other location. Mod-
els that succeed in generating agglomeration feature (another) stable asymmetric
equilibrium where economic agents separate into two locations: one with large
population and one with small population; see Krugman (1991). These ingredi-
ents are insu¢ cient to explain sorted agglomeration, since the population shares
of each type can be the same in both regions.5
Consider a separating equilibrium in adverse selection problems when there is
asymmetric information in the market. In a separating equilibrium, agents reveal
their types, and di¤erent types are separated by their actions. Can this separation
by selection be one of the driving forces of sorting and thus agglomeration? We
present a model that features classical asymmetric information in the labor market
resulting in adverse selection. A stable equilibrium in this model has sorted
agglomeration of agents.
We use a competitive contracting framework where there are large numbers
of both rms and workers; each worker can work for only one rm, and each
rm can employ at most one worker. There are two locations and two types of
workers, high ability and low ability. The total populations of the two types of
workers are xed exogenously. The high type dislikes work more than the low
type; this conforms to the commonly used single crossing property. Firms have
the same technology for production, regardless of location, of a single consumption
commodity that depends on the skill level of the worker employed. They know
the overall distribution of types, but the type of a particular worker is private
information to that worker. The rms compete with both potential entrants and
rms in the other region. A rm o¤ers a labor contract that species a lump sum
wage based on hours worked; the latter is an indicator of type. We show that
no pooling equilibrium, where both types of workers receive the same contract,
exists. Location is irrelevant to equilibrium, so any distribution of types across
5Models with only one type of producer and consumer have no hope of explaining sorted
agglomeration.
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regions is an equilibrium.
Our stability analysis performs a perturbation test on equilibria as follows.
A small fraction of workers is pushed from one region to the other. New rms
enter into the region where workers arrive and o¤er new contracts. New rms in
the region of origin enter, not knowing the types of the perturbed workers, and
make countero¤ers. The perturbed workers decide whether to accept these new
contracts in their new region or return to their region of origin and work under
the terms of the new contracts there. To return, there is a small moving cost for
high skilled workers, none for low skilled workers. If for all perturbations, there
is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where no workers want to return, then the
equilibrium is unstable. Otherwise, it is stable.
We assume that rms in one region cannot observe worker behavior, in partic-
ular labor supply or type, in another region.6 So if a worker is perturbed from a
region that has both types of workers in equilibrium, the rms in the new region
cannot infer her type with certainty. Neither can the entering rms in the region
of origin if the workers return. All of these rms can only use their beliefs, and
these beliefs are based on the equilibrium proportions of types in the region of
origin. Therefore, at an equilibrium where types are sorted, for example all the
low types reside in region 1 whereas all the high types reside in region 2, then
the type of a perturbed worker can be inferred by all since the region of origin is
known and there is only one type of worker in that region in equilibrium. This
is called a sorted equilibrium. This certainty about worker type can be exploited
by rms, and can render such sorted equilibria stable. In contrast, there can also
be integrated equilibria where both types cohabit at least one region. Depending
on parameters, an integrated equilibrium can either be stable or unstable.
Both the total populations of the two regions and the numbers of workers
6Our work is a distant relative of the important paper of Fang (2001). The major di¤erences
include the following. First, our consumer choice, namely equilibrium choice of region, is not
costly, whereas Fangs is costly. Second, Fang has a noisy signal, a test value where noise is
essential, whereas the second consumer choice in our model, labor supply, is not noisy. (In
Fangs model, if there were no noise in the test score, there would be no reason for the culture
signal.) Third, Fang uses Bayesian Nash equilibrium, whereas we employ a stability concept
natural in the spatial setting. The dening notion of region in our model is that worker labor
supply is only observable to active rms in the region where they work in equilibrium. In Fangs
model, the analogous notion would be that worker test scores are only observable among the
equilibrium group of workers to which they belong (this is not the assumption of that model).
Due to these di¤erences, the results from the models are qualitatively di¤erent.
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of each type inhabiting the regions will, in general, di¤er in a stable separating
equilibrium, sorted or integrated. Stable integrated equilibria exist only when
the proportion of mobile low skill workers in total population is small and the
technological advantage in productivity of the high skill workers is small. As the
exogenous parameter reecting productivity of the high ability workers increases,
perhaps due to skill biased technological progress, or as more low skill workers
become mobile, integrated equilibria become unstable and there is a transition to
the stable sorted equilibria.7 The intuition behind the mechanism is that as the
productivity of the high skilled rises or as the proportion of low skill rises, it is
easier for rms to o¤er pooling contracts at equilibrium proportions that dominate
the equilibrium (rst best) contracts for the low types (see Figure 4 below). Thus,
the low types can use their disguise (as an unknown type) to upset the stability of
integrated equilibrium. The sorted equilibria are special, since types are known
with certainty, so there can be no disguise.
In this contracting environment, the assumption of the Impossibility Theo-
rem that is violated is the assumption of perfect and complete (labor) markets
everywhere. It is our hope that our work prompts further investigation of the
importance of information asymmetry in the urban context.8
Other models induce the sorting kind of agglomeration in di¤erent ways,
though their primary purpose might not be to explain agglomeration. For in-
stance, Konishi (2008) is a ne example of sorting driven by local public goods in
the Tiebout tradition; he also considers adverse selection in that context. Mori
and Turrini (2005) is a ne example in the New Economic Geography tradition.
Agent heterogeneity in and of itself is insu¢ cient to drive sorting or agglomera-
tion, as the Starrett theorem certainly allows heterogeneity. So the main driving
force of agglomeration in any of these models cannot be heterogeneity.
We proceed to explain the reasons underlying a few of our modeling choices.
7This transition is similar to the comparative static transition in the New Economic Ge-
ography models due to population growth or a transport cost decrease; see Krugman (1991).
However, unlike the models of the New Economic Geography, our model does not use transport
cost or product di¤erentiation. Instead, it features asymmetric information, adverse selection,
and a rather standard competitive contracting environment. It is analytically solvable, in con-
trast with the models of the New Economic Geography (aside from those employing quasi-linear
utility).
8DeCoster and Strange (1993) provide an interesting model featuring asymmetric information
and agglomeration. However, the underlying driving force for agglomeration is the presence of
exogenous natural advantages of certain locations.
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A natural competitor to our model is a model of perfect competition that has a
localization externality between rms within a region. This externality could,
for example, be represented by a Cobb-Douglas rm production function where
output is dependent on private inputs as well as the aggregate quantity of labor of
one or both types employed in the region. If each type is complementary to only
rms employing workers of the same type in the same region, then separation of
types is a natural feature of equilibrium. We wish to make three points about
this alternative. First, in such an alternative model with or without land, the
agglomeration of all workers in one location is also a stable equilibrium. Second,
in the alternative model with land, the benets from the localization externality
are likely to be completely capitalized into land rents and thus passed on to the
landowners, provided that land supply is inelastic in each region. This would yield
a large set of stable equilibria, with arbitrary population distributions. Third,
our model is based on microfoundations, whereas the alternative is not, but the
alternative model makes assumptions that in a not very subtle manner yield the
outcome.
One alternative to the competitive contracting environment that we have cho-
sen is a purely competitive market framework, assuming that there are many
participants on both sides of the labor market. However, asymmetric informa-
tion in the form of adverse selection causes a breakdown of the competitive market
for standard reasons. The low skill workers are the lemonsin the labor mar-
ket. Nevertheless, there are many agents on both sides of the labor market, so
we use a competitive contracting environment. When we examine stability, there
is another reason to consider a contracting model: there are few consumers (an
arbitrarily small measure) and many rms in the labor market.
The opposite of a competitive approach would be to assume that there is only
one rm in each region, and thus there is a monopoly. We expect that our results
extend to this framework as well, though the assumption that there is a monopoly
in each region does not seem as reasonable empirically as the competitive assump-
tion. If monopolies were observed in regions, one would probably want to employ
a large xed cost rather than a decreasing returns production technology. Another
alternative is to use monopolistic competition or oligopoly for the labor market,
but these have the same drawbacks as the monopoly assumption and add further
complication to the model. After all, we are trying to explain how asymmetric
information can cause agglomeration in the simplest framework possible.
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We do not attempt to explain the dynamics of agglomeration in this paper.
Rather, as in the New Economic Geography literature, we perform an extended
comparative static exercise to show how critical exogenous parameters a¤ect the
characteristics of a stable equilibrium.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model and no-
tation. In section 3, we analyze separating equilibrium, show that there are no
pooling equilibria, and examine the stability properties of sorted as well as inte-
grated separating equilibria. A general discussion of the numerical results, with
a focus on the comparative statics in productivity of the high ability workers and
in the share of the population of high productivity workers in the total popula-
tion of mobile workers, is found in section 4. Section 5 provides conclusions and
directions for future research. Section 6, the appendix, contains all proofs.
2 The model
2.1 Notation
There are two regions in this economy indexed by j = 1; 2. There are two types
of mobile workers in the economy, indexed by i = H;L. Each worker is endowed
with one unit of labor. Workers supply labor to rms and earn a lump-sum
wage. Workers are di¤erentiated by their ability (high type and low type). Their
populations are denoted by NH ; NL 2 R++. A labor contract (w; l) 2 R+  [0; 1]
between a rm and a worker species a wage and a quantity of labor. Since
workers can only decide whether to take the o¤er or not, but cannot choose a
quantity of labor not o¤ered in a contract, there is no loss of generality in using
a lump-sum wage.
If a type i worker accepts the o¤er (w; l) from a rm, her utility is
ui (w; l) = w   il:
Parameters H ; L 2 (0;1), where H > L > 0, denote the marginal disutility
of labor of the two types. For a given utility level, dw
dl
jui = i. A larger i means
a higher disutility from work and that wage or consumption has relatively lower
value. This is the single crossing property used in models of asymmetric infor-
mation, for instance in the vast literatures on optimal income taxation, industrial
organization, health insurance, and education economics. As in these literatures,
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we presume that H > L rather than the opposite for the simple reason that the
opportunity cost of time is higher for the high type workers.9
There are a large number of potential rms in both regions that will hire these
two types of workers. For the convenience of analysis, we assume that rms are
small and one rm hires at most one worker.10 Firms have access to two types
of decreasing returns to scale technologies. The high type technology requires
high type labor while the low type technology requires low type labor. Each
of the rms commit to a production technology upon entering the market. If
the rm faces uncertainty about the type of labor they might hire, the rm may
adopt a mixed technology by choosing a probability mix of the high and low type
technologies. That is, the rm can play a mixed strategy over technologies. The
output of a rm is given by two cases: if a rm adopts the high type technology
and employs l units of type H labor, its production function is
fH (l) = l:
where  > 1 and 0 <  < 1. If a rm adopts the low type technology and employs
l units of type L labor, the production function is
fL (l) = l:
Parameter  represents the technological advantage of the high skill workers over
the low skill workers. Type H workers are of higher productivity and are lazier
(due to a higher disutility of labor). Take the produced consumption commodity as
numéraire. For a rm that hires with contract (w; l), we discuss its prot function
in two cases:
9We do nd that under the interesting circumstances when worker types are reversed as
L > H , a pooling equilibrium may exist. In this case, workers can accept a pooling contract
at a corner solution (w; 1): A deviating contract that attracts type H but not type L would be
outside the bound of l = 1. Any contract with l < 1 that attracts type H will also attract type
L. A deviating contract that attracts type L but not type H can be ruled out under proper
parameters where the type L indi¤erence curve passing through (w; 1) does not intersect the
type L production function at labor supply less than or equal to 1. If we assume L > H , we
again obtain separating equilibria as the outcome; the analogous pictures and algebra yield a
contract structure where the low skill type is at a tangency whereas the high skill type might
not be at a tangency. A second reason we do not use this version of the model is that it predicts
that the high skill wage rate (computed as an average over hours worked) will be lower than the
low skill wage rate.
10It is easy to relax this assumption, but at the cost of more notation.
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(1) When a rm knows with certainty the types of the workers, its prot
function takes the form
H (w; l) = fH (l)  w
if it hires a type H worker with contract (w; l), and its prot function takes the
form
L (w; l) = fL (l)  w
if it hires a type L worker with contract (w; l).
(2) When a rm does not know the types of the workers, given free mobility
of workers, it can infer the probability of hiring a particular type based on the
exogenously given proportion of types in the economy. The probability of hiring
a type H worker is NH
NH+NL
. So rms can adopt a mixed production function and
have expected prot function
 (w; l) =
NH
NH +NL
fH (l) +
NL
NH +NL
fL (l)  w.
Firms maximize expected prots over contract o¤ers. Facing potential en-
trants, rms will earn zero expected prot in equilibrium.
2.2 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, workers choose the most preferred contract terms among all o¤ers.
This gives us incentive compatibility conditions. In addition, all accepted con-
tracts must give nonnegative utility to workers. These are voluntary participation
conditions.11 Firms maximize prots, while taking workersactions into account,
by choosing among contracts that satisfy incentive compatibility and voluntary
participation conditions. This is a sequential game where rms move rst with
contract o¤ers and workers choose the best contracts.
The denition of equilibrium is formalized in a general way, allowing as many
contract terms o¤ered in the market as the number of rms. The actual number
of contracts in the market in any particular equilibrium will be very small as we
will see below. Finally, there is free entry in both regions; therefore, equilibrium
expected prot is zero.
With free mobility of workers and free entry of rms, location or region is
irrelevant to the equilibrium concept. It becomes quite relevant when studying
11For example, as an outside option they could work in agriculture.
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stability, since rms cannot observe worker behavior, in particular labor supply,
in the other region.
Let  denote Lebesgue measure on R and letM  [0;1) denote the (Lebesgue
measurable) set of rms that enter the market; note that in equilibrium the mea-
sure ofM is total worker population. All statements about rms should be taken
as almost sure (in other words, except possibly for a set of agents of measure
zero) with respect to Lebesgue measure in rms or consumers, appropriate to the
context. As is standard in measure theory, we denote by a.s.the term almost
surely. A contract structure is a set of active rms and a triple of measurable
functions, (M; w^; l^; d^), where w^ : M ! R+, l^ : M ! [0; 1], and d^ : M ! [0; 1]4.
Here M is the set of active rms, (w^(k); l^(k)) is the contract o¤ered by rm k,
and d^(k) species the region in which the rm enters and the type of technology
and labor it employs. Specically, d^(k) = (1; 0; 0; 0) means that rm k enters in
region 1 and employs the high type technology with the high skill type of labor,
d^(k) = (0; 1; 0; 0) means that rm k enters in region 1 and employs the low type
technology with the low skill type of labor, d^(k) = (0; 0; 1; 0) means that rm k
enters in region 2 and employs the high type technology with the high skill type of
labor, whereas d^(k) = (0; 0; 0; 1) means that rm k enters in region 2 and employs
the low type technology with the low skill type of labor. Since technology choice
is tied with labor types, we do not use extra notation for technology.
Let k 2M , a rm that has entered the labor market. For ease of notation, we
denote w^k = w^(k) and l^k = l^(k). Let C be the collection of all contract structures.
Next we dene the prot of a rm under a contract structure, and subject to
incentive compatibility. Fix a contract structure (M; w^; l^; d^). For expositional
purposes, it is best to do this using several cases, with our discussion embedded.
Call the expected prot function of rm k 2 M : k(M; w^; l^). Dene the rms
o¤ering contracts that are incentive compatible for the high type as ICH =n
k0 2M j uH

w^k
0
; l^k
0

 uH

w^k; l^k

almost surely for k 2M
o
. Analogously,
dene the rms o¤ering contracts that are incentive compatible for the low type
as ICL =
n
k0 2M j uL

w^k
0
; l^k
0

 uL

w^k; l^k

almost surely for k 2M
o
. It is
possible that either or both of these sets is empty. In equilibrium, they will not be
empty. Dene the set of rms o¤ering contracts satisfying voluntary participation
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(VP) conditions as follows:12
V PH =
n
k0 2M j uH

wk
0
; lk
0

 0
o
;
V PL =
n
k0 2M j uL

wk
0
; lk
0

 0
o
:
In contrast with standard mechanism design, here there are competing rms
or principals, so we must specify prots, and thus which workers are attracted
to rms, before dening equilibrium. If there were only one rm, then the dis-
tribution of workers could be an equilibrium selection rather than a piece of the
denition of rm prot.
In essence, the next step before we can dene equilibrium is to dene the
prot of a rm for any prole of strategies (contracts o¤ered) by all rms. This
is a rather technical exercise. Then we can dene equilibrium using this prot
function, since we will then know prots of each rm under unilateral deviations.
Embedded in the exercise of dening prot for a rm is a set of beliefs, one
for each rm, about the type of worker they will attract given the prole of
strategies of all rms. The appendix contains a complete and formal denition of a
consistent contract structure, namely that when rms calculate prots given the
contracts o¤ered by other rms, they account for both the incentive compatibility
constraints and the voluntary participation constraints in calculating the type
of worker they will attract, and thus the prot they expect to generate from
production.
Let n1H and n
1
L denote the number of type H and type L workers in region 1,
and let n2H and n
2
L denote the number of the two types of workers in region 2.
Notice that we use superscripts to denote regions and subscripts to denote labor
types.
An equilibrium subject to incentive compatibility is dened as the following.
Denition. An equilibrium is a consistent contract structure and a population
distribution
n
(M; w^; l^; d^); n1H ; n
2
H ; n
1
L; n
2
L
o
2 C  R4+ such that:
(i) Almost surely for rms k 2M , they maximize expected prot:
k(M; w^; l^)  k(M; w^0; l^0)
12It will turn out (see Proposition 1) that the voluntary participation constraints never bind
in equilibrium, so these can be removed if desired.
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for all consistent contract structures (M; w^0; l^0; d^0) 2 C such that w^0(k0) = w^(k0),
l^0(k0) = l^(k0) a.s. k0 2M .
(ii) Firms earn zero expected prot due to free entry:13 almost surely for rms
k 2M
k(M; w^; l^) = 0
(iii) Population distribution is feasible:
Z
M
d^(k)d(k) =
0BBB@
n1H
n1L
n2H
n2L
1CCCA
n1H + n
2
H = NH
n1L + n
2
L = NL
Condition (i) simply says that given the contract choices by other rms, any
rm is choosing a contract that maximizes expected prot.14 Condition (ii) says
that due to free entry, in equilibrium any rms prot must be zero. Condition
(iii) features a Lebesgue integral, and says that in equilibrium, in each region and
for each type of worker, the number of rms that are active is equal to the number
of workers, and that the sum across regions of the number of workers of each type
is equal to the exogenously given total populations.
There are many possible patterns of equilibria; potentially there can be con-
tinua of them. For example, each region may have only one type of worker (sorted)
or a mixture of both types of workers (integrated). Firms may o¤er di¤erent con-
tracts to di¤erent types (separation) or they may o¤er the same contract to both
13It would be possible to derive this at equilibrium from the free entry condition. In that
case, one would have the rms as [0;1), with the inactive rms using contract (0; 0). Then at
equilibrium, if prot were positive for any rm, another would enter and replicate its contract
and location, contradicting positive prot in equilibrium.
14Notice that the prot function of rm k, k, is independent of rm behavior, in particular
rm deviations, on a set of measure zero. Hence, when rm k deviates from strategy (w^(k); l^(k))
to strategy (w^0(k); l^0(k)), but all other rms k0 retain the original contract strategy (w^(k0); l^(k0)),
this new contract structure is the same as the old one up to a set of measure zero, measurable,
consistent, and yields a mathematically convenient way to represent deviations to check that
the strategy prole is a Nash equilibrium.
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types (pooling). We rule out unstable equilibria by a stability notion that operates
by perturbing the populations between the two regions.15
In the following sections, we will examine two patterns of equilibria: the sep-
arating equilibrium where there is only one type of worker in each region, called
sorted, and equilibria where both types are present in at least one region, called
integrated. Of the latter class of equilibria, the pooling equilibria where the same
contract is o¤ered to both types is of interest. Various kinds of equilibria will
exist for various exogenous parameter values.
2.3 Stability analysis
We conduct the following stability analysis on equilibria:16
1. Disturb the equilibrium by moving an arbitrarily small fraction of workers
from a region to the other. We consider a game played from this point on by
the perturbed workers and rms that might enter either region. Its extensive
form and justication are as follows. Given that the number of consumers moved
is arbitrarily small, and the number of rms that are potential entrants in the
market is assumed to be large, even if there were no information asymmetry, the
consumers are at an advantage relative to the rms. Therefore, facing competition,
rms that enter will earn zero prot.
2. Firms do not observe workers labor supply in the region of origin, but
they do know the equilibrium distribution of workers by type. Each entering rm
makes a contract o¤er based on this information:
2.1 If worker types are identied at the region of origin, rms will o¤er the rst
best contract for that type. In this case, consumers have no informational advan-
tage over rms, but they do have an advantage in that there are few consumers
and many potential rms. Thus, rms will choose prot maximizing production
plans given that they know each workers type, but will compete until prots are
zero. This will turn out to be a special case of (2.2), in the circumstance where
rms know with certainty workerstypes.
15It is possible that in equilibrium, one region is empty, in other words it has no workers or
rms. This situation could be eliminated as an equilibrium by adding land to the model.
16The New Economic Geography literature also relies on notions of stability for equilibrium
selection, but in contrast the stability concepts employed there tend to be very complicated
and driven by computation; see Fujita and Mori (1997). Krugman (1991) pioneered the use of
stability in two region models whereas Fujita et al (1999) develop it more fully.
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2.2 If worker types are not identied at the region of origin, meaning that
there is a mixture of both types of workers in that region, risk-neutral rms
make contract o¤ers that maximize expected prot. In this case, workers have
advantages over rms both in numbers and in information. An entering rm
will make an o¤er before observing labor supply or type, based on population
proportions of types in the region of origin at equilibrium.
3. Firms back in the region of origin, from where the perturbed workers have
been displaced, can make (zero expected prot) countero¤ers to the perturbed
workers to return home. Again, they only know the equilibrium distribution of
the perturbed worker types. The high type workers face a small moving cost
for the return, the low types face no moving cost.17 (The motivation for this
assumption is that high types feature location-specic capital that comes into
play for perturbations and moves, whereas low types do not. For example, low
types might be involved in manufacturing, whereas high types are involved in
research that uses teams or labs.) The rms in the region to which workers
have been pushed are aware that the rms in the region of origin might make
countero¤ers.
4. The equilibrium is unstable if for all small perturbations, there is a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium where no workers return home. Otherwise the
equilibrium is called stable.
5. There is a small continuity issue in the case of sorted equilibria, in that
there are only workers of one type in each region, so equilibria with a very small
population of the other type in each region could have di¤erent stability properties
than the sorted equilibrium. Thus, we examine stability of equilibria with small
populations of the other type in the region, if any are close by, and attribute their
stability properties to the limiting equilibrium as population becomes completely
sorted.
Loosely speaking, the motivation for this notion of stability is that for every
objection to the equilibrium, in the form of a perturbation to a new region and
corresponding new o¤ers, there is a counterobjection in that some agents will
return home. If no agents return home, then there is an objection without
counterobjection, so the equilibrium is unstable. In the end, this will reduce to
a comparison of the rst best contract for the low types to a pooling contract,
17There could also be a moving cost associated with the initial perturbation of workers, but
since this perturbation is an involuntary move, it makes no di¤erence to the analysis.
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where the equilibrium is stable if the pooling contract is not better for the low
types.
2.4 Signalling versus Screening
The di¤erence between signalling and screening models is in the order of moves of
the game. For example, a worker might signal their ability by choosing a costly
signal, education, moving before the rm that hires them. Screening models have
the rm moving rst, for example by presenting a menu of contracts for the worker
to choose from.
We wish to emphasize that here we employ a variant of a screening model but
with many competing rms. Choice of location by consumers is not a signal, since
it has no impact on equilibrium. The aggregate location choices of consumers do
have an impact on stability of the equilibrium.
Both signalling and screening models are used in the literature. Screening
models have been used in literatures on optimal income taxation, procurement,
and insurance. Signalling models are often used in labor economics. How-
ever, there is also a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, that employs
screening in the labor economics context; see, for example, Landeras and Perez
de Villarreal (2005).
For the purposes of our analysis, and in particular the notion of stability that
we employ, there must be some residual uncertainty, conditional on the signal,
about a workers ability. This allows for screening after the signal. There are
several reasons this might occur in the real world. The most obvious one is that
education, a natural signal, is not a perfect indicator of ability, perhaps because
it is noisy. It also might not be a good indicator of social skills, that Blum et
al (2006) nd to be important as a component of unobserved ability. Moreover,
education generally is used for human capital accumulation as well as signalling.
It would be hard for a worker to choose a scalar, such as education, to optimize
both the signal and the quantity of human capital accumulation; likely it optimizes
a convex combination of the two. Finally, it is possible that at the equilibrium
of the signalling game, the two types end up pooled. In any of these cases,
there is residual uncertainty conditional on the signal, and that will lead to wage
dispersion in screening equilibrium conditional on the signal.
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3 Characterization of Equilibrium
3.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Separating Equilibrium
There are two possible types of equilibria: separating equilibrium, where worker
types are revealed by their contract choices, and pooling equilibrium, where both
types of workers choose the same contract. We provide in this section a complete
characterization of equilibrium contracts. We present a few properties, namely
necessary conditions, of the equilibrium contracts rst. We say that a constraint,
such as ICL, ICH , V PL, or V PH binds if and only if it holds with equality for a
set of rms of positive Lebesgue measure. This standard terminology means that
the solution to the unconstrained optimization problem of a rm is not the same
as the one with the constraint imposed.
Proposition 1. The following hold in equilibrium:
(i) V PH and V PL do not bind.
(ii) There is only one contract for each type of worker across locations and
rms.
(iii) If ICL (respectively, ICH) does not bind, fH (respectively fL) is tangent
to a type H (respectively type L) indi¤erence curve at the equilibrium contract.
(iv) In a separating equilibrium, ICH does not bind.
Proof. See the Appendix.
For the next proposition, we require a couple of denitions to reduce notation.
Dene
el = " H
(NL+NH
NL+NH
)
# 1
 1
so that el is the best the high type can do with the production function mixed
between the high and low types at the economy-wide proportions. Let l^ be the
solution to
Ll^
   

l^

+


L
 
1 
  L


L
 1
1 
= 0:
Proposition 2.
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(i) When 

l^
 1
 H , so ICL does not bind, a separating equilibrium
exists and type L workers receive contract

w^L; l^L

=


L
 
1 
;


L
 1
1 

,
whereas type H workers receive contract

w^H ; l^H

=




H
 
1 
;


H
 1
1 

.
(ii) When 

l^
 1
> H , so ICL binds, a separating equilibrium exists if
and only if
w^L   L

l^L   l^

  H l^  el  NL + NH
NH +NL
  H

At such an equilibrium, type L workers receive contract

w^L; l^L

=


L
 
1 
;


L
 1
1 

,
whereas type H workers receive contract

w^0H ; l^


=

w^L   L

l^L   l^

; l^

.
(iii) Workers reveal their types in equilibrium. In other words, there is no
pooling equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Please refer to Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the equilibrium contracts
with nonbinding ICL, and Figure 2 for the case when ICL binds. In these pictures,
the horizontal axis represents labor supply whereas the vertical axis represents
wage, output or numéraire. Only the separating equilibrium where rms can
distinguish worker types exist.
Figure 3 illustrates why a pooling equilibrium cannot exist. Dene t =
NH= (NH +NL). The di¢ culty with a pooling equilibrium lies in the rmsability
to propose a deviating separating contract that attracts only the more productive
(type H) workers. It is always possible to prot from deviating to a separating
contract with type H workers. Such contracts are represented by the shaded area
in Figure 3.
The reason a separating equilibrium might not exist when the incentive con-
straint ICL binds is that a pooling contract can dominate the high type contract
for the high type utility when the incentive constraint binds. In Figure 2, this
pooling contract might be in the area between the linear indi¤erence curve for the
high type at the separating contract and the high type production function. This
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Figure 1: Separating equilibrium, ICL not binding
pooling contract can, in turn, itself be dominated as in Figure 3.
To this point in the analysis, location is irrelevant. Any distribution of the
types between the two regions can be an equilibrium, provided that all contracts are
separating.
Worker types are identied by their contract choices in the market. Types will
not be pooled together at the same contract. Yet in a spatial setting, there is
another kind of integration. Worker types can be integrated in a region or they
can be sorted between two regions. In the next subsection we distinguish by their
stability properties these two types of separating equilibria.
3.2 Stability properties of separating equilibria
Suppose a separating equilibrium has population distribution (n^1H ; n^
1
L; n^
2
H ; n^
2
L) :
Let sj = bnjH=  bnjH + bnjL be the high type share of region j. There are two kinds of
separating equilibria: a sorted separating equilibrium has only one type of worker
in each region, i.e., sj 2 f1; 0g , whereas an integrated separating equilibrium has
at least one region containing a mixture of the two types, i.e., 0 < s1 < 1 or
0 < s2 < 1. We examine their stability as follows. Before stating the precise
result, it is useful to present a preliminary argument.
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Figure 2: Separating equilibrium, ICL binding
Claim. An integrated separating equilibrium is stable if and only if the pool-
ing contract at equilibrium proportions for each region is not better for the low
type than the rst best contract for the low type.
This means that stability analysis of an integrated separating equilibrium boils
down to examining the rst best contract for the low type and the two pooling
contracts at equilibrium proportions, one for each region. That examination is
found in the next proposition.
The proof of the claim is rather brief, but informative, so we give it here.
Recall rst from the denition of stability that rms will be indi¤erent among
the contracts they o¤er, since such contracts all yield zero expected prot. Due
to the small moving cost, the rms in the region of origin know that any o¤er
they make to high types will be rejected, since it can be dominated by an o¤er by
rms in the new region, who move rst. Thus, stability is completely determined
by the low types. Suppose rst that the pooling contract dominates the rst
best contract for the low types. Then if the rms in the new region o¤er only
the pooling contract, and rms in the region of origin are left with only the rst
best contract for the low types (since the high types will never return), we have a
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Figure 3: Nonexistence of pooling equilibrium
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which nobody moves back to the region of
origin, so the equilibrium is unstable. If the rst best contract for the low types
is at least as good as the pooling contract, then the only subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium has the low types always o¤ered the rst best contract for them, and
they move back (assuming that if they are indi¤erent, they move back).
Proposition 3.
(i) A sorted separating equilibrium with nonbinding ICL is always stable.
(ii) A sorted separating equilibrium with binding ICL is always stable.
(iii) An integrated separating equilibrium with either a binding or a nonbinding
ICL is stable if and only if
 
sj+ 1  sj (sj+ 1  sj) 
sjH + (1  sj) L
 
1 
  L

(sj+ 1  sj) 
sjH + (1  sj) L
 1
1 
 


L
 
1 
+ L


L
 1
1 
 0; j = 1; 2:
(iv) Fixing other parameters except for , there are critical values 1 > s() > 0
and (sj) > 1 such that any integrated separating equilibrium with regional high
type shares s1; s2 > 0 is unstable: a) if min [s1; s2] < s(), b) if and only if
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 > min [((s1); (s2)].
Proof. See the Appendix.
The key intuitions and implications of this result are as follows. For the
purpose of simulations, we shall focus on the case of a nonbinding ICL. As
detailed above, the issue of instability of equilibrium reduces to the question of
whether the pooling contract at equilibrium proportions of population for at least
one of the two regions is better for the low type than the rst best contract.
An entering rm makes an o¤er to a perturbed worker before observing labor
supply or type, based on population proportions of types in the region of origin at
equilibrium. For a pooling contract, risk neutrality on the part of rms leads to
their use of average production functions and average disutility of labor. Thus, an
entering rm can o¤er a pooling contract that maximizes expected prot under
the average slope of the high and low type production functions and the average
disutility of labor , where the average is taken according to the population of
types in the region of origin at equilibrium. Furthermore, competition drives rms
prot to zero. Stability analysis employs disequilibrium behavior of rms and
workers, in contrast with the equilibrium contracting behavior studied in section
3.1.
The sorted separating equilibrium is always immune to a perturbation of work-
ers since all agents are fully informed, so contracts are rst best. Firms will not
o¤er a better contract to attract perturbed workers, and the low types will always
return to the region of origin. In contrast, when a mixture of workers of di¤erent
types is moved to another region, a rm entering in the destination region will
o¤er a contract based on its expectations. This may give the low type a contract
better than the equilibrium contract, for the following reason. Consider an inte-
grated separating equilibrium. When the share of the high type in total mobile
population is large so that the deviating contract is very close to the high type
equilibrium contract, it is not attractive to the low type. This is because the high
type equilibrium contract is not attractive to the low type by condition ICL. So
an integrated separating equilibrium can be stable. When the share of high type
in total population is small enough, an entering rm will o¤er a more attractive
contract (w; l) to the low type. This renders the integrated separating equilibria
unstable (see the illustration in Figure 4). For any given high type productivity ,
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there is a critical regional high type share s() such that, for any smaller shares,
integration of types is unstable.
Figure 4: Unstable integration of types
Higher  creates a larger di¤erence between the productivity of the two types.
This allows entering rms to o¤er a more attractive contract to the low type when
integrated with the high type. Thus, when the productivity of the high type is
relatively low, integrated separating equilibria can be stable. But when this
productivity is relatively high, they will be unstable. For any xed regional high
type share s, there is a critical value of high type productivity, (s), such that
a larger  means integration of types is unstable. We will illustrate numerically
these critical values next in Section 4.18
4 Simulation results
In this section, we illustrate with numerical examples the qualitative e¤ects of
two key parameters, the technological advantage of high type workers, , and the
18In our model (without land), whether or not the fully agglomerated equilibrium with all
agents in one region (and thus integrated) is stable or not depends on the parameters.
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share of high type workers in the mobile population, t, on stable equilibria. The
equilibrium contract of the low type is xed by their preferences and production
function. The following parameter values are used in the computations:  = 0:4,
H = 1:2, L = 0:45.
4.1 Equilibrium
As  takes a higher value, the high type production function becomes higher and
more concave. It pushes both the high type equilibrium wage and labor quantity
up. As a result, a high type worker enjoys a higher utility level. Table 1 shows
a set of numerical results. Parameter  takes values from 1:1 to 1:2. VP and IC
conditions are satised in this range. ICL binds for   1:201. To keep this
section simple, we only consider  < 1:201.
 1 1:02 1:04 1:06 1:08 1:1 1:12 1:14 1:16 1:18 1:2
wH 0:481 0:497 0:513 0:530 0:547 0:564 0:581 0:598 0:616 0:633 0:651
lH 0:160 0:166 0:171 0:177 0:182 0:188 0:194 0:199 0:205 0:211 0:217
uH 0:288 0:298 0:308 0:318 0:328 0:338 0:348 0:359 0:369 0:380 0:391
Table 1
See Figure 5 for a graphical representation. Parameter  is graphed on the
horizontal axis, whereas the values of the inequality constraints are on the vertical
axis. Nonnegative values mean that the constraints are satised. VP: thin, IC:
thick, type H: dotted, type L: dashed. When  exceeds 1:201, ICL binds, im-
plying that the low skill type will be indi¤erent between the equilibrium contracts
for low and high skill types.
4.2 Stability
The share of the high type in total mobile population in a region and the tech-
nological advantage of high type workers both a¤ect the stability of integrated
separating equilibria. As we have seen in Proposition 3, there are critical values
of the high type share and the technological advantage parameter for which in-
tegrated separating equilibria are not stable. We analyze the parameter range
where all integrated separating equilibria are unstable for all possible regional
high type shares. It is convenient to use the highest of the two regional high
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Figure 5: IC and VP conditions as a function of 
type shares, and compare the highest high type share to the critical share. Recall
that t = NH= (NH +NL) is the economy-wide share of the total high type mobile
population in the total mobile population. Actually, this share t is the highest
value of the minimum high skill share of the two regional shares:
t = max
n1H+n
2
H=NH ;n
1
L+n
2
L=NL
min[
n1H
n1H + n
1
L
;
n2H
n2H + n
2
L
]:
If one region has a high type share higher than t, the other region must have a
share lower than t. Thus, the task is reduced to nding the critical high type
share in total population t such that, if t < t, then any integrated separating
equilibrium is unstable.
In order to discuss comparative statics with respect to t, it is convenient to
introduce a large population of immobile workers of the low skill type in the
background. These immobile workers can engage in agriculture, tied to land.
Their presence allows us to discuss in a simple way how equilibrium changes when
more low skill workers become mobile by switching to work in manufacturing, in
particular resulting in a decrease in t.
For a xed t share, there is a critical value  such that any integrated equilib-
rium is unstable for  > . Pairs of critical (; t) constitute a critical curve that
separates the parameter space into two parts. For  values above or t values below
the critical curve, no equilibrium with integration of types is stable. The benet
of a deviating pooling contract for the low type (utility from a deviating pooling
contract minus utility from the equilibrium or rst best contract) is presented in
25
Figure 6 (a positive value means integration-of-types is unstable).
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Figure 6: Unstable range for type integration
A set of critical values (; t) is reported in Table 2.
 1 1:02 1:04 1:06 1:08 1:1 1:12 1:14 1:16 1:18 1:2
t 0 0:023 0:050 0:081 0:117 0:162 0:218 0:290 0:392 0:555 0:944
Table 2
With immobile low skill workers in the background (say, working in agricul-
ture), as more are released to become mobile, t shrinks and eventually only sorted
separating equilibria are stable. When the technological advantage of the high
type  increases, the integrated separating equilibria eventually become unstable,
whereas the sorted separating equilibria remain stable.
4.3 Transition of Stable Equilibria
We illustrate the transition of stable equilibria using a concentration index  =
s1  s2 2 [ 1; 1]. The index  represents the degree to which type H workers are
concentrated in region 1 relative to region 2. When  =  1, all type H workers
are in region 2. When  = 0, both regions have the same share of type H. When
 = 1, all type H workers are in region 1. A larger  means a higher share of
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type H workers in region 1 relative to the share in region 2. The variable  is
endogenous.
We can now evaluate  at equilibrium for changing parameters  and t.19
When t is xed and the technological advantage parameter  increases from 1,
integration of types is stable for middle ranges of . In Figure 7, the shaded area
represents the values of pairs of the productivity parameter  and the concentra-
tion index  such that the associated integrated separating equilibrium is stable.
This range is diminishing as  is larger. When  passes the critical  (t), any equi-
Figure 7: Transition over  for xed t
librium with integration of types is unstable. Then only the sorted separating
equilibrium is stable, and we have agglomeration. Thus, sorted agglomeration can
be caused by increased productivity of high skill workers. For example, if t = 0:29,
the critical  = 1:14.
When  is xed and the high type share in total population t varies, we
represent equilibria in Figure 8. The shaded area represents pairs of high type
share t and concentration index  such that the associated integrated separating
equilibrium is stable. For a large high type share t, integration of types is stable
19Let N1 = n1L + n
1
H and N
2 = n2L + n
2
H . For a given high type share in total population t,
any regional share combinations
 
s1; s2

can be supported as a separating equilibrium (sorted
or integrated) if the following condition is satised: s1N1 + s2N2 = t
 
N1 +N2

. Among this
continuum of equilibria, those with
 
s1; s2
   t; t are stable.
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Figure 8: Transition over t for xed 
for intermediate values of . As more low types become mobile, t decreases and for
t  t (), no equilibrium with integration of types is stable. Then only the sorted
separating equilibrium is stable, and once again we have sorted agglomeration
caused by mobility of more low skill workers.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we examine whether adverse selection in a labor market with asym-
metric information can be a factor that generates agglomeration. Agglomeration
is dened in a broad sense as a stable but unequal population distribution be-
tween regions. If this is a consequence of sorting agents by type, then we call
this sorted agglomeration. We nd that separation of workers by contract type
is sustained as the only equilibrium outcome. There are di¤erent contracts for
di¤erent types of workers in equilibrium. Workers of di¤erent types can be inte-
grated in their equilibrium locations. When there is a large share of high type
mobile workers in the total mobile population, integration of types is stable. An
integrated, stable equilibrium features a similar mixture of workers in each region.
When more low type workers are released from their immobility, integration of
types becomes unstable. Empirically, this represents a shift of low skill workers
from agriculture, where they are tied to land, to manufacturing, where they are
free to move. Calculations of the authors from U.S. Department of Commerce
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(1975, p. D 11-23) show that the percentage of the total labor force not in agricul-
ture in the U.S. rose from 52% in 1870 to 96% in 1970. With a small proportion
of high type mobile workers in the total mobile population, integration of types
is unstable. Any stable equilibrium has the large population of low type mobile
workers in one region and high type mobile workers separated in the other region.
Thus, the increase in the number of low skill workers from 1870 to 1970 can help
explain agglomeration during this period. The technological advantage of high
skill workers is also a key factor in the stability of integrated equilibria. If the
productivity of the high type increases, integration of types becomes less stable.
Given the same share of high type in total mobile workers, a larger technological
productivity advantage of high skill workers results in the agglomeration of work-
ers by type. This skill biased technological change is consistent with evidence
of more recent sorted agglomeration, for example the Berry and Glaeser (2005)
work on human capital di¤erences between cities or the Combes et al (2008) work
on wage dispersion across cities. It is also consistent with a general increase in
average human capital, provided that greater human capital for the high types is
causing their productivity to rise. So, given asymmetric information in the labor
market, either increased mobility of low skill workers or increased productivity of
high skill workers can result in separate agglomeration of workers by type.
Extensions of the model include the following. First, land markets can be
added and the functional form assumptions can be generalized. We expect similar
results. In its current form, the transition to agglomeration is abrupt, as in
early models of the New Economic Geography. We expect that, analogous to
those models, the addition of land or amenities to our sparse model could smooth
the transition. Our functional forms were chosen so that the model is easy to
solve analytically. The cost of other functional forms would be more complex
calculations; the cost of general functional forms could be no method to solve the
model analytically.
The model could be extended to include more regions and more types of con-
sumers (in particular, a continuum of types). More generally, heterogeneity of
rms could be added. If rm types were common knowledge, then the results
would likely be straightforward and similar. But if rm types were private infor-
mation, that would complicate the model substantially, since there would be two
sided uncertainty in the labor market.
Extensions involving multiple periods and dynamic information revelation are
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possible but are likely di¢ cult. In communities with small populations, our
model might not be relevant because the type of a particular worker could be
easily observable.
Further questions to be addressed include welfare properties of equilibrium al-
locations and testable implications. Evidently, in the case of nonbinding incentive
constraints, the equilibrium will be rst best, but when an incentive constraint
binds, the equilibrium will generally be second best. In the latter case, subsidies
to low skill workers (say, conditional on acceptance of a low skill contract) have
the potential to loosen the incentive constraint, improving welfare (independent
of any equity e¤ects). We have presented some comparative statics that might
serve as testable implications. In particular, it is evident from our pictures that
high skill workers receive a higher average wage than low skill workers, so one can
look for increasing wage dispersion for cities in a country over time, or larger wage
dispersion for cities in developed countries in contrast with cities in developing
countries.20
6 Appendix: Formal Denition of a Consistent
Contract Structure and Proofs
Denition of a Consistent Contract Structure:
Let n denote set subtraction. A contract structure (M; w^; l^; d^) is called con-
sistent if d^ satises the following rules. Fix k 2 M . (i) If the contract
o¤ered by rm k does not give either type as much utility as that o¤ered by
another rm or the outside option, then it attracts no workers and prots are
zero: if k 2 Mn[(ICH \ V PH) [ (ICL \ V PL)] then k(M; w^; l^) = 0. In
this case, d^(k) = (0; 0; 0; 0). (ii) If rm k o¤ers a contract that is taken by
only one type of worker, then that rm knows with certainty the type it at-
tracts: if k 2 (V PH \ ICH)n(ICL \ V PL), then k(M; w^; l^) = H

w^k; l^k

and
d^(k) = (1; 0; 0; 0) (if the rm is in region 1) or d^(k) = (0; 0; 1; 0) (if the rm is in
region 2); if k 2 (V PL \ ICL)n(ICH \ V PH), then k(M; w^; l^) = L

w^k; l^k

and
d^(k) = (0; 1; 0; 0) (if the rm is in region 1) or d^(k) = (0; 0; 0; 1) (if the rm is in
20A more direct approach, suggested by Bob Hunt, is to examine the extent of geographic
localization of information about worker/consumers, for example in the form of credit bureaus;
see Hunt (2005).
30
region 2). (iii) Consider the case where the contract o¤ered by the rm optimizes
the utility of both types of workers given the contract structure. Then it is possi-
ble for a rm to attract any prole of workers, leading to a prot correspondence.
To avoid unnecessary complications, and as is standard in the literature on mech-
anism design, we select a prole. It is a discontinuous selection, but again we
will guess and verify equilibrium, so its continuity properties are not important.
(iii.a) If k 2 ICH \ V PH \ ICL \ V PL and ([ICH \ V PH)]n[ICL \ V PL]) = 0
and ([ICL \ V PL]n[ICH \ V PH ]) = 0, then k(M; w^; l^) = NHNH+NLfH

l^k

+
NL
NH+NL
fL

l^k

  w^k and d^(k) = ( NH
NH+NL
; NL
NH+NL
; 0; 0) (if the rm is in region 1)
or d^(k) = (0; 0; NH
NH+NL
; NL
NH+NL
) (if the rm is in region 2). That is, when the
rms o¤ering contracts that optimize utility for the high and low types are the
same, then a rm in this set can expect the economy-wide distribution of workers.
(iii.b) If k 2 ICH \ V PH \ ICL \ V PL and ([ICH \ V PH)]n[ICL \ V PL]) = 0
and ([ICL \ V PL]n[ICH \ V PH ]) > 0, then k(M; w^; l^) = H

w^k; l^k

and set
d^(k) = (1; 0; 0; 0) if the rm is in region 1 or d^(k) = (0; 0; 1; 0) if the rm is in
region 2. That is, if a rm o¤ers a contract that optimizes utility for both types
of workers, but contracts are o¤ered by other rms that are as good for the low
type but not as good for the high type, then the rm expects only high types.
Similarly, if k 2 ICH \V PH \ ICL \V PL and ([ICH \V PH)]n[ICL \V PL]) > 0
and ([ICL \ V PL]n[ICH \ V PH ]) = 0, then k(M; w^; l^) = L

w^k; l^k

and
d^(k) = (0; 1; 0; 0) (if the rm is in region 1) or d^(k) = (0; 0; 0; 1) (if the rm
is in region 2). (iii.c) Finally, if a rm o¤ers a contract that optimizes utility for
both types of workers but other rms o¤er contracts that are as good for only
the low type, whereas yet other rms o¤er contracts that are as good only for
the high type, then the rm expects to get the economy-wide mixture of work-
ers: if k 2 ICH \ V PH \ ICL \ V PL and ([ICH \ V PH)]n[ICL \ V PL]) > 0
and ([ICL \ V PL]n[ICH \ V PH ]) > 0, then k(M; w^; l^) = NHNH+NLfH

l^k

+
NL
NH+NL
fL

l^k

  w^k and d^(k) = ( NH
NH+NL
; NL
NH+NL
; 0; 0) (if the rm is in region 1)
or d^(k) = (0; 0; NH
NH+NL
; NL
NH+NL
) (if the rm is in region 2).21
Proposition 1. The following hold in equilibrium:
(i) V PH and V PL do not bind.
21Since such stategies are never protable, we could also assume that the rm attracts no
workers in this case.
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(ii) There is only one contract for each type of worker across locations and
rms.
(iii) If ICL (respectively, ICH) does not bind, fH (respectively fL) is tangent
to a type H (respectively type L) indi¤erence curve at the equilibrium contract.
(iv) In a separating equilibrium, ICH does not bind.
Proof. (i) Suppose a type H worker accepts an equilibrium contract (w0; l0) 6=
(0; 0) with uH (w0; l0) = 0. Thus, w0 = H l0. By zero prot, fH (l0) = w0 and by
concavity d
dl
fH (l0) < H . We can nd a new contract (w00; l00) by reducing the labor
supply required by " < 0, so that l00 = l0 " and w00 = w0 H". This new contract
gives the worker the same utility (implying ICH) but increases the rms prot.
Note that (w0; l0) satises ICL and uL (w00; l00) = w0 Ll0+L" H" < uL (w0; l0),
so (w00; l00) satises ICL. These arguments apply to type L as well.
(ii) We prove this for the two types separately. First, suppose there are
two distinct contracts (w1; l1) and (w2; l2) o¤ered to type H in equilibrium, and
uH (w1; l1) = uH (w2; l2). There are three possibilities: both rms are certain
about worker types and use fH , both rms are uncertain about worker types and
use the expected production function NH
NH+NL
fH ()+ NL
NH+NL
fL (), or one rm uses
fH and the other uses the expected production function.
Case 1: two rms use fH . By zero prot, fH (w1; l1) = fH (w2; l2) = 0.
There is a new contract ((w1 + w2) =2; (l1 + l2) =2) that is indi¤erent for type H
(implying ICH) and yields more prot. The new contract satises ICL since both
(w1; l1) and (w2; l2) satisfy ICL.
Case 2 can be argued the same way as Case 1.
Case 3: One rm uses fH and the other uses the expected production function.
Using zero prot, it must be that fH (l1) = w1, NHNH+NLf
H (l2)+
NL
NH+NL
fL (l2) = w2
and fH (l2) > w2. There is a new contract (w1 + H"; l1 + ") for small " > 0 such
that it is indi¤erent for type H (implying ICH), attracts only type H workers,
and increases prot. It also satises ICL.
Second, suppose there are two distinct contracts (w1; l1) and (w2; l2) accepted
by type L in equilibrium. There are three possibilities: both rms use fL, both
rms use the expected production function NH
NH+NL
fH () + NL
NH+NL
fL (), or one
rm uses fL and the other uses the expected production function.
Cases 1 and 2 can be argued in the same way as Case 1 for type H.
Case 3: Using zero prot, it must be that NH
NH+NL
fH (l1)+
NL
NH+NL
fL (l1) = w1,
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fH (l2) = w2 and thus NHNH+NLf
H (l2)+
NL
NH+NL
fL (l2) > w2. There is a new contract
(w1 + H"; l1 + ") for small " > 0 such that it is indi¤erent for type L (implying
ICL) and increases prot. It also satises ICH since both (w1; l1) and (w2; l2)
satisfy ICH .
(iii) Suppose type H workers accept an equilibrium contract (w0; l0) (this is
unique by property (ii) and nonzero by property (i)) and ICL does not bind.
There is a small " > 0 such that contracts (w0 + H"; l0 + ") and (w0   H"; l0   ")
violate none of the VP or IC conditions. If d
dl
fH (l0) > H , the rm can protably
deviate to contract (w0 + H"; l0 + "). If ddlf
H (l0) < H , the rm can protably
deviate to (w0   H"; l0   "). So, ddlfH (l0) = H . The tangency condition can be
proved in the same way for type L workers and ICH .
(iv) Due to the single crossing property and property (ii), given that ICL binds,
ICH also binds in and only in a pooling equilibrium. Since we are considering
only separating equilibrium, ICL does not bind. Suppose we have a separating
equilibrium with contract (w1; l1) for type H and (w2; l2) for type L and ICL does
not bind. Therefore, a rm hiring a type H worker has the tangency condition:
fH (w1; l1) = H (by property (iii)). By the concavity of the production functions,
uH (w1; l1)  uH
 
fH (l) ; l

> uH
 
fL (l) ; l

for all l > 0. This means ICH cannot
bind since w2 = fL (l2) by the zero prot condition.
Proposition 2.
(i) When 

l^
 1
 H , so ICL does not bind, a separating equilibrium
exists and type L workers receive contract

w^L; l^L

=


L
 
1 
;


L
 1
1 

,
whereas type H workers receive contract

w^H ; l^H

=




H
 
1 
;


H
 1
1 

.
(ii) When 

l^
 1
> H , so ICL binds, a separating equilibrium exists if
and only if
w^L   L

l^L   l^

  H l^  el  NL + NH
NH +NL
  H

At such an equilibrium, type L workers receive contract

w^L; l^L

=


L
 
1 
;


L
 1
1 

,
whereas type H workers receive contract

w^0H ; l^


=

w^L   L

l^L   l^

; l^

.
(iii) Workers reveal their types in equilibrium. In other words, there is no
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pooling equilibrium.
Proof. (i) and (ii) We construct the unique separating equilibrium contracts by
utilizing results in Proposition 1. First, since ICH does not bind, the low type is
always o¤ered a contract at a tangency. Suppose a rm hires a type L worker with
contract (wL; lL). By zero prot, (lL)
   wL = 0 and by tangency of the type L
production function and the type L indi¤erence curve, d
dl
fL (lL) =  (lL)
 1 = L.
The equilibrium contract is
l^L =


L
 1
1 
; w^L =


L
 
1 
:
By the concavity of fL, wL   LlL > 0 and V PL is satised.
Second, since uL

w^L; l^L

> 0 and fH

l^L

> fL

l^L

= w^L, this particular
indi¤erence curve passing through

w^L; l^L

intersects fH at a point

w^; l^

such
that l^ < l^L. This l^ can be solved from zero prot:
fH

l^

= w^L   L

l^L   l^

;
or
Ll^
   

l^

+


L
 
1 
  L


L
 1
1 
= 0:
For part (i), if d
dl
fH

l^

 H , or


l^
 1
 H ;
then type H can achieve a higher payo¤ than

w^; l^

at a contract

w^H ; l^H

such that l^H  l^. This is solved from zero prot,  (lH)   wH = 0, and the
tangency of the type H production function and the type H indi¤erence curve:
d
dl
fH (lH) =  (lH)
 1 = H . Therefore,
l^H =


H
 1
1 
; w^H = 


H
 
1 
:
By the concavity of production functions, V PH , ICH and ICL are all satised.
For part (ii), if d
dl
fH

l^

> H , then

w^; l^

is the highest payo¤ type H
can get under zero prot and ICL, since ICL binds. Note that V PH is satised
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by concavity whereas ICH is satised due to the slope di¤erence, H > L, of
indi¤erence curves.
To this point of the proof, we have used necessary conditions for equilibrium
contracts to solve for them. To prove formally that these are equilibrium con-
tracts, we must show that there are no independent, protable rm deviations.
For part (i), this can easily be seen, for example, using Figure 1. These are rst
best contracts. Any alternative contract o¤ered by a rm will yield negative
prot, or will violate a production constraint. For part (ii), we must ensure that
there is no pooling contract that will give higher utility to the high type than
the proposed separating contract. Calculations yield the weak inequality given
in part (ii).
(iii) Suppose there is a nontrivial pooling contract (w; l) 6= (0; 0) in the market
that both types of workers accept with a high type share NH
NH+NL
. If a rm can o¤er
a di¤erent contract arbitrarily close to (w; l) that attracts type H workers but not
type L workers, it can use production function fH instead of the average of two
production functions. This brings more prot since the increase in production is
a discontinuous jump. A contract (w   L"; l   ") for small " > 0 is that kind of
deviating contract. A type H worker is indi¤erent between the deviating contract
and (w; l), while a type L worker prefers (w; l), since uL (w   H"; l   ") = w  
Ll + (L   H) " < uL (w; l).
Proposition 3.
(i) A sorted separating equilibrium with nonbinding ICL is always stable.
(ii) A sorted separating equilibrium with binding ICL is always stable.
(iii) An integrated separating equilibrium with either a binding or a nonbinding
ICL is stable if and only if 
sj+ 1  sj (sj+ 1  sj) 
sjH + (1  sj) L
 
1 
  L

(sj+ 1  sj) 
sjH + (1  sj) L
 1
1 
 


L
 
1 
+ L


L
 1
1 
 0; j = 1; 2:
(iv) Fixing other parameters except for , there are critical values 1 > s() > 0
and (sj) > 1 such that any integrated separating equilibrium with regional high
type shares s1; s2 > 0 is unstable: a) if min [s1; s2] < s(), b) if and only if
 > min [((s1); (s2)].
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Proof.
(i) Sorted separating equilibrium with nonbinding ICL:
When the two types of workers are sorted by location in a separating equilib-
rium, rms know for sure the type of a worker coming from a particular region.
All agents are fully informed. Thus, when a worker moves to another region, an
entering rm o¤ers a rst best contract that yields zero prot. This contract
turns out to be that same rst best contract that the worker receives in equilib-
rium. This is where part 5 of the stability notion comes into play. Although the
high types will not move back to their region of origin due to the moving cost,
any low types will (assuming that if they are indi¤erent, they move back). This
yields a stable equilibrium, as the limit of stable integrated equilibria that tend
to the sorted equilibrium.
(ii) Sorted separating equilibrium with binding ICL:
In equilibrium, the contract for the high type is second best. When a high
type worker is perturbed, an entering rm o¤ers the rst best contract, and the
worker stays in the new region. However, the same argument as in (i) applies
for low skill workers and equilibria that are integrated but close to sorted. See
condition 5 of section 2.3.
(iii) Integrated separating equilibrium with a nonbinding ICL:
Using the claim, we must simply compare, for the low types, the pooling
contract to the rst best contract.
The stability of an integrated separating equilibrium depends on the compo-
sition of its worker populations, since the composition determines the pooling
contracts (one each for workers perturbed from the two regions). When a small
measure of workers is moved from region j to the other region, the rms hiring
the perturbed workers have expected output
sjfH (l) +
 
1  sj fL (l) :
Since the workers cannot be distinguished, rms will pay a uniform wage rate to
all workers that equals the expected disutility of labor
 = sjH +
 
1  sj L:
36
Prot maximization determines the quantity of labor hired l:
d
dl
 
sjfH (l) +
 
1  sj fL (l) = :
This means
l =

(sj+ (1  sj)) 

 1
1 
:
By competition, the rm will o¤er a total wage w at zero prot.
w =
 
sj+ 1  sj (l) ;
=
 
sj+ 1  sj (sj+ (1  sj)) 
sjH + (1  sj) L
 
1 
:
Type L workers will prefer it over the rst best contract if
w   Ll > w^L   Ll^L; or 
sj+ 1  sj (sj+ 1  sj) 
sjH + (1  sj) L
 
1 
  L

(sj+ 1  sj) 
sjH + (1  sj) L
 1
1 
>


L
 
1 
  L


L
 1
1 
:
Integrated separating equilibrium with a binding ICL:
Exactly the same calculations work when ICL binds, since the behavior of the
high type is irrelevant. Hence, the equilibrium is unstable if and only if the low
type workers want to stay in their new region, thus rendering the behavior of high
types irrelevant, and reducing the problem to the same one as with a nonbinding
ICL.
(iv) Let
 (; s) = (s+ 1  s)

(s+ 1  s) 
sH + (1  s) L
 
1 
  L

(s+ 1  s) 
sH + (1  s) L
 1
1 
denote the utility level of a low type worker from a deviating contract and s is
the high type share of the original region. Therefore, the contract is attractive if
 (; s) >  (; 0) :
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First, let  (; s) = (s+1 s)
sH+(1 s)L .
@ (; s)
@s
= (  1) ( (; s)) 1  + (s+ 1  s) 
1   ( (; s))
2 1
1 
@ (; s)
@s
  L
1   ( (; s))

1 
@ (; s)
@s
;
where
@ (; s)
@s
= 
(  1) (sH + (1  s) L)  (s + 1  s) (H   L)
(sH + (1  s) L)2
:
We have
 (; 0) =

L
;
@ (; s)
@s
j s=0 =  (  1) L   (H   L)
(L)
2 :
This means
@ (; s)
@s
j s=0 = (  1)


L
 
1 
+

1  


L
 2 1
1 

(  1) L   (H   L)
(L)
2
  L
1  


L
 
1 

(  1) L   (H   L)
(L)
2 ;
= (  1)


L
 
1 
> 0:
Therefore,  (; s) >  (; 0) for all s close enough to 0. An integrated equilibrium
is unstable if s1 or s2 is small enough.
Second, since
@ (; s)
@
=
s
sH + (1  s) L ;
@ (; s)
@
= s ( (; s))

1  + (s+ 1  s) 
1   ( (; s))
2 1
1 
d (; s)
d
  L
1   ( (; s))

1 
d (; s)
d
= ( (; s))

1 

s+
s
1    
Ls
(1  ) (sH + (1  s) L)

;
= ( (; s))

1 
s
1  

1  L
sH + (1  s) L

:
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We have, for all s > 0,
@ (; s)
@
> 0
because  < 1 and L
sH+(1 s)L < 1. Moreover, for xed s > 0,
@(;s)
@
is increasing
in , and thus is bounded away from zero. Notice, however, that
@ (; s)
@
js=0= 0
We conclude that  (; s) >  (; 0) if and only if  is large enough.
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